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Bailey: Toward a More Complete Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: A Judicial

STUDENT NOTE
TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING: A JUDICIAL
OVERIEW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
The cornerstone of informal rulemaking is the notice and
comment procedure.1 Through this simple, and often efficient
system,2 administrative agencies perform many of their delegated duties. 3 This broad delegation, however, carries with it a
substantial burden. Administrative agencies must decide con-

' 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977); K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, §

6.01-1 (1976). The general subject of proposed rulemaking has promoted publication of a voluminous amount of material. See, e.g., Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A ProposedRelationship between Administrative Procedures and Judicial
Review, 72 Nw. L. REv. 15 (1977-78); Robinson, The Making of Administrative
Policy, Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjuication and Administrative Procedural Reform, 118 PA. L. REV. 485 (1970); Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the
Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); Wright, Court of Appeals Review of FederalRegulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. REV, 199
(1974); Hahn, Procedural Adequacy in Administrative Decision-Making: A
Unified Formulation,30 AD. L. REV. 467 (1978); Hamilton, Proceduresfor Adopting Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in AdministrativeRulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276, (1972); Verkuil, JudicialReview
of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
2 Congress may lawfully delegate power to administrative agencies. K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 2.01, 6.01 (3d ed. 1972). The Supreme Court
has on only two occasions ruled that delegation of legislative power to a federal
administrative agency was unlawful. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 203 U.S. 388
(1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Congress cannot delegate rulemaking authority to private parties or organizations.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). (A delegation by Congress to coal
producers and workers was held invalid.)
The following is a statement which typifies the United States Supreme
Court's philosophy on delegation of rulemaking authority to administrative agencies: "Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that
exertion of legislative power does not become a futility." Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). See generally McGowan, Congress,
Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1971).
3 For a discussion of this complex task of agencies and courts see, McGowan,
Reflections on Rulemaking, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1978-79); Wright, The Court of
Appeals Review of FederalRegulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. REV. 199
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Wright, The Court of Appeals Review].
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troversial and complex issues that affect all facets of American
life." The failure of the rulemaking procedure may unduly delay
the implementation of laws which are designed to protect the
health of workers, 5 preserve the environment,' and insure that
the nation's business proceeds in an orderly fashion.7 It is
therefore necessary to properly adhere to rulemaking procedures in order that substantive issues will be settled in an expedient and efficient fashion.'
A cursory analysis of the basic provisions of Section 4 of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) does not reveal the problems inherent in informal rulemaking proceedings.' One of the
procedural problems which has prompted only limited academic
discussion" is that of how to effectively notify interested parties
of the substance of the proposed rule." Although the APA requirements are simple, the resolution of complex issues by informal rulemaking complicates the task of providing adequate
notice of the proposed rule to the public.2 An agency will often
issue a series of notices on the same subject, with each new
notice incorporating the substance of the prior one but adding
new and variant facts which must be comprehended and commented upon.13 The result is often a convoluted notice and comment period extending over a number of years." This creates an
immense amount of confusion, often resulting in a law suit in
which the court may order yet another round of notice and cornSee Wright, The Court of Appeals Review, supra note 3.
' OccupationalSafety and Health Administrative (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 et
seq. (1976).
6 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321(a) (1976).
' Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976).
' See Wright, The Court of Appeals Review, supra note 3.
5 U.S.C. § 553. See notes 99, 113 infra and accompanying text.
10 Discussion of the notice issue in law review articles is usually confined to
its relation to procedural hybrids. E.g., Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L.
REv. 401 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking]. Cf.
Hamilton, Proceduresfor Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Need
for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton, Administrative Rulemaking].
" See notes 59-122 infra and accompanying text.
12 See notes 70-79 infra and accompanying text.
13E.g., Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
1, 1d. Cf. Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 559 F.2d 74
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 70-79 infra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/9

2

Bailey: Toward a More Complete Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: A Judicial
19811

NOTICE OF RULEMAKING

ment."s While there are no easy solutions to this problem, this
note will analyze the efficiency of the present system of notifying the public of proposed rules and will examine current
thought on how the system can be improved.
This paper is divided into six parts. Parts I" and 1117 discuss
the basis for and purpose of giving advanced notice of agency
rulemaking to the public. The emphasis in Part I is on the general requirements with respect to notice of a proposed rule in
light of the enactment of the APA. Part II analyzes the reviewing courts' resolution of controversies in which litigants claim
that notice of the proposed rule was insufficient to apprise them
of the "subjects and issues"" ultimately addressed in the promulgation of the final rule. Although the facts differ substantially in each case where the sufficiency of the notice is contested, 9
there is one common theme that runs throughout the courts'
decisions." The content of the notice of the proposed rule is inadequate if it deprives interested persons of their right to submit informed comments on the issues before the agencies.2
Otherwise, the issuance of the notice would be a mere perfunctory task having no significant bearing on the substance of
22
the final rule.
Part III of- this paper discusses the probable effect of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee
Power Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council4 upon the
notice requirement in informal rulemaking. This decision, which
precludes a reviewing court from ordering regulatory agencies
to implement additional procedures which exceed those required

"5See,

e.g., note 13 supra.
" See notes 49-58 infra.
" See notes 60-122 infra and accompanying text.
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976).
"E.g., United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810, 1828 (1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3969 (June 30, 1981).
1 See text accompanying note 56 infra.
" E.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). See text accompanying notes 86 & 96 infra.
2 See generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1979); See
also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1976).
1 See notes 163-75 infra and accompanying text.
2" 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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by the APA, 2 may result in increased remands for additional
notice and comment." This prediction is partly based upon the
continued use of the "hard look"' doctrine by the federal courts.
Courts which apply the "hard look" doctrine carefully scrutinize
the informal rulemaking record compiled by the agency, to determine whether it is sufficient to support the agency's ultimate
decision. 8 Additional notice and comment is one way in which a
court can require an agency to re-examine its decision without
violating Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co.29
Any discussion of administrative procedure should be
analyzed in light of fairness to the participants in the rulemaking process." This is the subject of Part IV. 1 Full notice of the
proposed rule is essential to insure that the public will have a
fair opportunity to comment on the issues decided in the final
rule. The question of how many notices are necessary and how
much comment is to be allowed must be answered by the normative concepts of administrative procedure. 2 A careful balance
must be struck between the efficiency of the procedure and the
regulatory goals of the agency23 Additionally, the public must
be satisfied that the procedures employed by the agency will
be sufficient to bring about a fair and rational resolution of the
3 4
substantive issues.
1 Id. at 548, 549. For a discussion of possible exceptions to the Court's ruling
in Vermont Yankee Power Co. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, see note 199
infra. For a list of articles written about the case see note 164 infra.
" See notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text.
' See notes 180-97 infra and accompanying text.

28Id435 U.S. 519.
1 See notes 198-239 infra and accompanying text. One writer commenting on
procedural fairness has stated:
A sense of futility accompanies any attempt to speak of fairness,
the perception of fairness, or the consent of the governed, because to do
so is to indulge in fiction. Nonetheless, the fiction is a necessary one.
Contemporary political theory suggests that the governmental
sovereign cannot demand, but must entreat, the allegiance of the
governed.
Hahn, ProceduralAdequacy in Administrative Decision-making:A Unified Formulation, 32 AD. L. REV. 467, 500 & n.185 (1976). [hereinafter cited as Hahn, AdministrativeDecision-Making].
1 Id. n.185.
I See text accompanying note 209 infra.
2

3

Id.

3 Id. For a detailed explanation of the nexus between procedure and rational
decisions, see Hahn, Administrative Decision-making,supra note 30, at 505-08.
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Part IV also examines the procedural hybrids which the
agencies have adopted of their own volition. The EPA and the
FDA have been particularly innovative in assuring that the rulemaking process proceeds fairly.36 Congress has also been active
in adding additional procedures.3 7 A close look will be taken at
the Consumer Product Safefy Act38 which embraces a complicated scheme for providing notice of proposed rulemaking. 9
Part V4" is an extension of the examination of improved
methods for giving notice of proposed rulemaking. Former
President Carter, by executive order,41 required executive agencies to implement additional administrative procedures beyond
those outlined in the APA. Many of these procedures were left
in place by President Reagan who also issued an executive order
modifying the regulatory process. The important similarities"
and differences between the Carter and Reagan reforms are
3
analyzed.1
The United States Congress is also likely to act upon a
number of pending bills which may give the-President the power
to modifk rules promulgated by both independent and executive
agencies" and which provide for legislative veto of agency rules.
The Federal Judiciary Reform Act, commonly referred to as the
Bumpers Amendment,45 will dissolve all presumptions in favor of
regulatory rules and each rule promulgated will have to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 This note will examine the possible effect of these proposals upon the notice requirement in informal rulemaking.
See notes 215-32, infra and accompanying text.
See notes 215-24 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 225-28 infra and accompanying text.
38 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2082 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
s See notes 229-36 infra.
40 See notes 237-51 supra and accompanying text.
4! Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (1978), 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978),
revoked by President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
42 For an historical discussion of the roots of alleged administrative procedural tyranny, see Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 261 (1978). See also text accompanying note 207 in-

fra.

43 President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 131393 (1981),
suspended all major rules promulgated by the agencies but had not become effective at the time the order was issued.
4 See notes 253-65 infra and accompanying text.
," See note 256 infra, and accompanying text.
486Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

The Conclusion 7 of this note calls for increased procedural
flexibility in administrative law and for greater procedural experimentation by regulatory agencies. Agencies have the power
to adopt procedures beyond the APA which may result in broader
and more meaningful public participation in the rulemaking process. Agencies should exert this power to the fullest extent. Advanced notice of proposed rules, personal notice to parties likely
to be affected by the promulgation of rules, and the use of a second round of notice and comment are all viable means of improving the regulatory system.
I.

SUBSTANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT

The requirements for initiating informal rulemaking under
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are simple
and straightforward."8 The notice of the proposed rule is published
in the Federal Register 9 with a statement of the time, place, and
nature of the rulemaking proceeding." Reference is made to the
legal authority under which the rule is proposed,"1 and either the
terms or the substance of the proposed rule, or a description of
the subjects and issues involved is given.52 Following the publi, See notes 267-71 infra and accompanying text.
," 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §
6.01-1 (1976).
" Id. § 553(b). Recipient of an FCC permit to operate a radio station not entitled to personal notice and an opportunity for a public hearing; proper and timely publication in the Federal Register of notice of proposed rule imparts sufficient
notice under 5 U.S.C. § 553, United States v. Daniels, 418 F. Supp. 1075 (D.S.D.
1976).
50 Id. § 553(b)(1). Some agencies are required by statute to hold public hearings prior to promulgation of a final rule. For example, rules promulgated with
regard to EPA's regional air quality control plan must be preceded by a public
hearing, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 103, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(c)(2)(E)
(repealing 42 USC 1857 c-5(c) (1976)), cited in South Terminal Corp. v. E.P.A., 604
F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For other examples of public hearing requirements in informal rulemaking, see Hamilton, Administrative Rulemaking, supra note 10, at
1350 & n.191.
s" Id. § 553(b)(2). Only agencies with rulemaking authority may proceed in
that manner. For discussion of rulemaking authority, see Davis, supra note 48, §
6.04. For a discussion of the present tendency of the United States Supreme
Court to refuse to allow agencies to exercise powers not specifically delegated to
them, see note 185 infra and accompanying text.
I Id. § 553(b)(3). The substantive requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976)
are the focal point of this paper. The requirement of publishing the notice of the
proposed rule in the Fed. Reg., supra note 49, and the agency's need to specify its
rulemaking authority, are only discussed when necessary for proper analysis.
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cation of the notice in the Federal Register, interested persons
may participate in the rulemaking process by submitting comments and criticisms to the agency in question." The agency, in
its informal discretion, may choose whether or not to permit interested persons to make oral presentations of their comments
and concerns." This permits the agencies to control the course
of the informal rulemaking proceeding. 5
The underlying reason for publication of the proposed rule is
"to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general
application."56 Prior to publication of the notice of the proposed
rule, however, it is expected that the agencies will investigate
and study the subject matter involved in order that the notice
will be sufficient to permit "intelligent participation in the rulemaking process." 57 Research of the issues also constitutes the
initial decision-making process in informal rulemaking. This investigatory process and synthesis of the knowledge thus acquired, manifested in the forms of the notice, provides the public
with insight into the agencies' contemplated decision, defines
the issues in controversy and determines who may participate.'

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING

Two general arguments are often advanced for compelling
courts to stop the enactment of the final rule because the original notice was defective. First, it is asserted that the content
Id. § 553(c).
Id.; Tidewater, Express Lines Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 955, 957
(D. Md. 1968), see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For a discussion of the impact of Vermont Yankee on judicially created procedural "hybrids" see notes
163-79 infra and accompanying text; But cf. Internatibnal Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974)
(Oral hearing required "even for rulemaking when controversial regulations

governing competitive practices" are involved. (citations omitted)).
Buckeye Cable Television v. F.C.C., 387 F.2d 220, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1967)

citing F.C.C. v. W.J.R. The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
1 American Standards, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 257 (Ct. Cl. 1979),
quoting NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 764 (1969).
" House Comm. on JudiciaryReport on the Administrative ProcedureAct,
H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946) reprinted in Legislative History of
the Administrative ProcedureAct, 1946, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 258
(1946). [hereinafter cited as H.R. No. 1980].
1' Hahn, Administrative Decision-making, supra note 30, at 471.
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of the proposed agency rule was inadequate to notify interested
persons of the subjects and issues to be determined by the rulemaking proceeding;" second, it is argued that the difference between the proposed-rule and the final rule was so substantial
that the agency acted unfairly by failing to give advance notice
of the intended deviation. 60 In response to these allegations
courts have developed general principles and "verbal formulas""1
which serve to put "teeth 6 2 in the basic notice requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
One settled principle is that the original notice need not con" E.g., Tour Brokers v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, (D.C. Cir. 1978) (notice
insufficient); American Standards Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(notice inadequate); Arlington Oil Mills, Inc. v. Knebel, 543 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.
1976) (notice inadequate); Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (notice
inadequate); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1980) (notice inadequate);
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975)
(notice adequate); United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810 (1980)
(notice adequate) and; Forester v. C.P.S.C., 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (notice
adequate).
' E.g., South Terminal Corp. v. E.P.A., 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (notice
adequate); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 1096 (1980). In a large number of cases, the arguments that the
notice was inadequate, or that the difference between the proposed rule and the
final rule was too substantial, overlap. For instance, if agency X suggested in a
notice of proposed rulemaking that it was contemplating A and B, but in the final
rule A remained the same and B was modified or replaced by C, contestants of
the rule would argue that the notice was inadequate to alert them to modifications in B or the substitution of C. Contestants would also argue that the
mofidication of B or the substitution of C was such a substantial change from the
proposed rule that a new round of notice and comment should be initiated. See,
e.g., Southland Mower v. C.P.S.C., 619 F.2d 499, 525 (5th Cir. 1980) (notice sufficient); American Federation v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (notice
sufficient); American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 840 (3d Cir.
1978) (notice sufficient except in one instance), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 38 (1980)
dismissed pursuant to Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules 49 U.S.L.W. 3145
(Sept. 10, 1980) (78-919); Association of Am. Railroads v. Adams, 485 F. Supp.
1077, 1085 (D.D.C. 1978) (notice sufficient); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d
676, 684, 685 (9th Cir. 1949) (notice sufficient), aff'd, 336 U.S. 860 (1949); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846, 852, 853 (4th Cir. 1978) (notice sufficient); Mt. Mansfield Television Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 1971)
(notice sufficient); and Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (notice sufficient).
El United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, supra note 19, at 1828.
Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 CoLuM.
L. REv. 258, 290 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Verkuil, The Emerging Concept].
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tain every precise proposal ultimately adopted in the final rule."
This allows the agency to modify the rule as a result of new or
critical material received through the rulemaking process.'
Otherwise, an agency would be compelled to initiate a new
round of notice and comment each time it adjusted the substance of the proposed rule to reflect informed comment."5 The
reviewing court is satisfied if the content of the notice "fairly
apprise(s) interested persons of the subject and issues before
the agency." 68 Or stated differently, "the notice should contain a
sufficient exposition of the purposes and basis of the regulation
8 7
as a whole to satisfy the legislative minimum. 6
When the difference between the proposed and final rule is
the subject of litigation, substantive changes are permissible as
long as the "changes are in character with the original scheme,"
or, "the difference is a logical outgrowth of the notice and comment already given."69 The allowance of substantive difference
between the proposed and the final rule is consistent with the
courts' insistence that informal rulemaking remain flexible
Mt. Mansfield Television Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 1971).
Southland Mower v. CPSC, 619 F.2d 449, 525 (5th Cir. 1980). (Agency adjusting its economic data because of suggestions contained in comments received
"increases our confidence in the agency."); American Federation of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Failure to permit agency to adjust original
tables which established pulmonary function values would essentially deny to the
agency any benefit from comments received.)
I International Harvester v. Ruckelhaus, 478, F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973,
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
1 American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3851 (June 24, 1980), dismissed pursuant to rule 53 of
the United States Supreme Court 49 U.S.L.W. 3145 (Sept. 10, 1980) (78-919).
Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 658 (1st Cir. 1974).
Id at 659, accord, BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st
Cir. 1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1096 (1980); United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, 8 OSHA 1810, 1828 (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3969 (June 30, 1981). Cf.
Jones v. Bergland, 456 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Jones court stated,
"[C]ompliance with the notice requirement is had where the rule finally adopted
does not substantially differ from the proposed rule." 456 F. Supp. at 645 (citing
Chrysler Corp. v. DOT, 515 F.2d 1053) (6th Cir. 1975)) and South Terminal Corp.
v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). Although not reaching the question of
whether a substantial change would be a cause for remand to the respective agency, the court in Chrysler did mention that cases had been remanded because the
final rule substantially differed from the proposed rule. See notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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enough to allow agencies to adopt plans and ideas different from
their own."
Although often repeated by the courts, the principles and
statements referred to above serve only as judicial guidelines
because of the factual complexity of each case." The court must
carefully scrutinize the original notice to first decide whether it
is sufficient on its face. For example, in Forester v. Consumer
Product Safety Commission,72 the agency, following a series of
notice and comment rounds, promulgated safety requirements
for all types of bicycles." Petitioners argued that the agency's
original notice of the rule was only intended to cover children's
bicycles.74
The court agreed that the first notice only referred to safety
requirements for children's bicycles, but held that a final rule
which was ultimately suspended,75 and a series of published
amended proposals76 were sufficient to alert the public that the
final rule would apply to adult bicycles as well." The court, having decided that the agency had given adequate notice, 8 refused
to consider petitioners' argument that the difference between
the proposed and final rule was so extreme as to warrant additional notice and comment. 9
Parties who have contested the sufficiency of an agency's
notice on the ground that the content of the proposed rule and
E.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).
7 8 OSHC at 1828.
72 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

13Id. at 781; 41 Fed. Reg. 57449 (1925).
7 559 F.2d at 787.
5 Id. at 781-87.
76

Id.

Id. at 787-88.

78 Id.

S1d. The court also mentioned that between July of 1974, and Nov. of 1975,
over 50 comments were received on the subject of incorporating all bicycles
within the regulations. Cf. Wagner Electric Co. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1972) (Although some persons were well informed of the proposed regulations,
and submitted comments on the issue in controversy, the court still held that the

notice was invalid.)
Judge MacKinnon, who wrote the majority opinion in Forester, 559 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1977) dissented in United States Steel Workers, 8 OSHC 810 (1980),
where the majority held that the notice of the proposed rule was sufficient. See

note 110 infra and accompanying text.
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the final rule differed substantially have not been very successful." The two leading cases on point are South Terminal
Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency,8' and BASF
Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle.8
In South Terminal, the EPA, proceeding under its rulemaking authority, promulgated regulations designed to reduce
pollution caused by excessive vehicular traffic.83 One provision
of the final rule consisted of a regulation which precluded the
construction of new parking facilities unless permission was
granted by a regional administrator." Despite petitioner's claim
that the substantial change in the final rule was unfair, the court
stated that "a hearing is intended to educate an agency to approaches different from its own; in shaping the final rule it may
and should draw on comments tenlered."'
Similarly, in BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle,8 manufacturers of pesticides sued to enjoin the EPA from adopting final
rules governing discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by
the pesticide industry." the EPA, after issuing interim regulations on pesticide pollution, sought comments on them.88 One of
the interim regulations placed organic pesticide manufacturers
in separate categories.89 The response to the agency's interim
regulations was negative. The pesticide manufacturers wanted
the EPA to increase the number of industrial categories. In the
final rule, however, the agency combined three of the categories
into one classification.
See notes 60 and 69 supra.
81 504 F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1974).

598 F.2d 637 (st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).
504 F.2d at 654.
Id. at 658, 659.
Id. at 659. The statute under which the rule was promulgated, 42 U.S.C. §
1857 h-(5)(b)(1) (1976), has been repealed. It is now codified in 42 U.S.C. §
7410(c)(2)(E) (Supp. I. 1977). The statute now states that when any rule is promulgated under the regional quality control plan, which is part of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970, §§ 109(b)(1, 2), 307(b)(1), it is required that the EPA hold
at least one additional hearing if the agency is contemplating substantialchanges
in the promulgation of the final rule. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(2)(E) (Supp. I. 1977) (emphasis added).
598 F.2d 637.
" Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 643.
8, Id. at 642.
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The manufacturers were surprised by the agency's decision
to substantially depart from the interim regulations by reducing
rather than increasing the number of industrial categories.9 2 On
appeal, the manufacturers argued that the agency should have
initiated a new round of notice and comment before deciding to
dramatically alter the categorization plan. 3 The court disagreed,94
however, holding that the merger of the categories was a reasonable alternative and that the petitioners should have anticipated that the final rule would differ from the interim one. 4 The
court's decision was based, in part, on the fact that the comments submitted by petitioners to the agency were critical of
the effluent guidelines assigned to the different industrial subshould be clear to commencategories. 5 The court stated, "[i]t
tators when they criticize a regulatory scheme that if the agency
accepts those criticisms a new scheme would be substituted."9
The principles set forth in BASF Wyandotte Corp.97 were
important in the disposition of United Steel Workers of America
v. Marshall," a case which illustrates the wide latitude given to
administrative agencies in developing a final rule. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OHSA) issued a series
of proposed rules designed to reduce workers' exposure to air
borne lead particles in industrial work places. 9 Although the
agency was accused to every procedural error imaginable,10 the
most serious defects alleged by the industry were the insufficiency of the notice and the radical difference between the initial and final rules. As recorded in the Federal Register, OHSA
I&k at 643.
at 641.

9 Id.

' Id. The court, in response to petitioners' claim that the change from the interim regulations to the final regulations deprived them of proper notice of informal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3), stated: "This requirement is a critical
one because it supports the assumption we make with regard to EPA's substantive decisions that those decisions are in fact the product of informed, expert
reasoning tested by exposure to diverse public comment" (emphasis added).

9

598 F.2d at 643.

Id. at 637.
8 OSHO at 1831.
" See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
"I

Petitioners asserted that the decision-maker was biased, that the staff

played an improper role in the decision, that the agency's use of consultants was

improper and that the notice of the proposed rule was inadequate. 8 OSHC at
1810-28.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/9

12

Bailey: Toward a More Complete Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: A Judicial
NOTICE OF RULEMAKING

1981]

first listed the major issues raised during the rulemaking proceeding as follows:"'
1) Whether the proposed permissible exposure limit to lead
should be 100 mg/m3 and whether this level incorporates an appropriatemargin of safety.
2) Whether the subclinical effects of exposure should be
considered in establishing a standard for occupational exposure
to lead.
3) To what extent are there groups with increase susceptibility to lead in the working population, such as women of child
bearing age; and should increased susceptibility, if it exists, be
considered in establishing a standard for occupational exposure
to lead."'
The final rule promulgated by the agency limited the permissible air borne lead content to 50 mg/m 3, a substantial drop
from the 100 mg/m 3 level.' 3. The lowered level substantially increased the number of workers included within the protected
class, and increased the technological burdens on the industry."4
Moreover, several industries which could have complied with
the 100 mglm 3 standard were brought within the scope of the
lower standard where compliance was not feasible." 5 Judge
Wright, however, was not persuaded that the proposed rule had
been insufficient to alert the industires that a lower permissible
standard for exposure to lead (PEL) might be finally adopted. 00
He pointed specifically to three clauses in the notice which raised
the possibility that OHSA might find the higher PEL not safe
enough: 1) the appropriate margin of safety, 2) whether subclinical effects should be considered and 3) whether there might
exist in the population groups with increased susceptibility to
lead."' Judge Wright recognized that OHSA could have served
the parties better had it listed two or more alternative PELs
and invited comments on each of them, 08 but he ruled that the
notice was "legally adequate"'' to apprise the parties that a
101

Id. at 1828, 1829; 40 Fed. Reg. 45934/1-2 (1975).

Id- (emphasis added).
" 8 OSHC at 1828.

104Id.
210

Id
Id. at 1829.

"*

17 Id.
10 Id.
I"

Id.
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lower PEL was being contemplated by the agency. In a strongly
worded dissent, Judge MacKinnon stated that the notice was inadequate because OHSA received almost no evidence of the
technological feasibility of the final rule."' For instance, the
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) failed to contest the
100 mg/m 3 standard because its member industries could have
complied with it."' AISI claimed the notice "lulled them into
avoiding the feasibility issue, creating a feasibility issue which
did not exist before.""' The majority concluded that AISI's argument was made in good faith, but that the failure to comment
was a "strategical error." According to the court, a closer
analysis of the record would have revealed3 to the petitioners
that a lower PEL was being contemplated."
Judge Wright then focused his attention on those parties
who had submitted comments on the 100 mg/m3 standard but
were shocked to find that the agency had accepted an even
lower standard."' Judge Wright dismissed their arguments by
relying on precedent first established in Weyerhauser Corp. v.
Costle"5 and later expanded in BASF Wyandotte Corp."6 "We
must be satisified....that given a new opportunity to comment,
commenters would not have their first occasion to offer new and
different criticisms which the agency might find convincing."'"
Judge Wright perceived that the petitioners in United States
Steel Workers and BASF Wyandotte Corp. were similarly
I Id. at 1905. Judge MacKinnon in reference to the content of the proposed
rule stated, "OSHA rested on vague statements in the notice of the proposed rule
and perhaps the clairvoyance of the particular witness." Id.
1,1Id. at 1832 & n.49.

1 Id. The Bell System had a more "subtle" argument. The change from the
proposed rule not only lowered the PEL, but changed the formula for the PEL
from an eight-hour time weighted average (TWA) based on a 40-hour work week,
to an eight-hour TWA without reference to a work week. Bell argued that the
change was critical because under the original TWA it would have complied with
the proposed rule. The gravaman of their argument, according to the court, was
the notice stating that the standard "would apply to all work places in all in-

dustries where lead is exceptionally present or released" 40 Fed. Reg. 45-93713
(1975).

8 OSHC at 1832 & n.49.
"I Id. at 1831.
113

11 540 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).

8 OSHC at 1831 (emphasis original) (citation omitted).
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situated.118 The court in both cases believed that, no matter what
the regulatory agency might have proposed, the petitioners
would have criticized it, and would have ultimately petitioned
the reviewing court to remand the agency's final rule for additional notice and comment.119 To emphasize this point, Judge
Wright quoted from the decision in BASF Wyandotte Corp.
Not only do we think that petitioners had fair notice.. ., but
we cannot think how their comments would have differed fundamentally if they had known what EPA would do. Though they
would have had a different proposition against which to argue,
their proposed solutions would, presumably, have been the
same for the same reasons. They might have responded in
greater volume or more vociferously, but they had not shown us
that the content of their criticisms would have been different to
the point that they would have stood a better chance of convincing the Agency .... 110
Judge Wright concluded that any defect in the notice of proposed
rulemaking constituted "harmless error. 121 He stated: "[petitioners] contended that the proposed standard was unfeasible,
and would have done the same for the final standard. OHSA
would still have believed [petitioners'] cost estimates grossly inflated and its vision of technology too narrow, and would have
asserted its legal power to force changes of uncertain costs and
technological feasibility." 12
The impact of this precedent is both fundamental and
significant. Once the court determines that interested persons
' Id. For a discussion of BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, see notes 86-96
supra and accompanying text.
"' 8 OSHC at 1831.
Id. at 1810, 1831 (citing BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,
642 (1st Cir. 1979)). In his dissent, Judge Mackinnon severely criticized the majority for relying on BASF Wyandotte. He asserted that that type of reasoning, carried to its logical extreme, would have permitted OSHA to lower the PEL standard to 10 mglm 3 regardless of its technological feasibility. "It is absurd to com3
pare the probative effect of the evidence for 100, 50, or 10 mglm and state the only difference is in the word force of the advocacy." 8 OSHC at 1906. Cf. Wright,
The Court of Appeal's Review, supra, note 4. In this article Judge Wright expressed his concern with respect to delaying approval of substantive issues which
are decided upon during the informal rulemaking process, and which affect the
health of workers and the quality of the environment, on nonsubstantive grounds.
'2' 8 OSHC at 1831.
'

Id. at 1832.
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have had an opportunity to submit meaningful comments, a new
round of notice and comment will not be granted regardless of
the difference between the proposed and final rules, as long as
the final rule emerges logically from the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, if the court is convinced that a new round of commentary would not persuade the agency to alter the content of
the final rule, the rule will be sustained.
The courts, however, are more likely to remand an agency's
final rule for additional notice and comment when the underlying data upon which the rule is based is not disclosed to all parties, or is scattered throughout a series of complex notices. 2 3
For instance, in Wagner Electric Co. v. Costle,'24 the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration proposed a series of
regulations intended to modify vehicle safety standards. 2 ' The
proposed rule incorporated by reference rules originally promulgated by an automobile industry research group. 26 One of the
proposed changes was to amend the standards governing performance of turn signals and hazard warning flashers in automobiles.2 ' The notice, however, failed to forewarn the public of
the agency's intent to modify previous standards by eliminating
the permissible failure rate of flashers. 8 The agency argued
that the notice was sufficient since some parties had submitted
comments concerning the sampling procedure data upon which
the permissible failure rate was based.'29 The court found that
those who did submit comments were more knowledgeable
about the subject and more aware of the undisclosed data, and
that persons not so knowledgeable were interested persons
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 553131

" Wagner Electric Co. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974); American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
12 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).

Id.
1 Id. at 1015. Lighting Committee of the Society of Automobile Engineers
(SAE).
I Id. at 1016-17.
125

128Id.
12

Id. at 1016-19.

Id. Although the court did not elaborate, it appeared that large manufacturers of automobile parts had access to all of the data which supported elimination of the flasher rate.
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In Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle,'31 pulp and paper makers petitioned the court to stop the enforcement of regulations promulgated by the EPA and designed to limit effluent discharges. 32'
The court upheld all of the regulations except one which was
based on information not properly disclosed through the rulemaking process.1 3 3 The EPA changed its secondary waste load
requirements"' without permitting persons to comment on the
'
Furthermore, the agency
data which prompted the change. 35
relied upon data received during the publication of the interim
regulations without disclosing it to the public.1 36 The court held
that the agency's final conclusion was not a "logical outgrowth"
of the notice and comment period, but was based on "a complex
mix of controversial and uncommented upon data and calculations." ' Unlike the court in United States Steel Workers 38 and
BASF Wyandotte,'3' this court believed that additional public
comment might have altered the agency's ultimate decision. 40
When there is serious doubt as to whether the original
notice was sufficient, some courts have analyzed the seriousness
of the impact of the final rule upon the affected parties."' For
,' 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
' Id. at 1019. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 as
amended 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
'1 590 F.2d at 1028. The court commended EPA's efforts to accomodate
public participation. Four rounds of notice and comment were given by the agency. For an example of how comments can change the agencies' thinking, see id. at
1028 n.17.
"' Id. at 1029. "Raw waste load" is the total amount of waste generated by
the mill before treatment. After this waste goes through primary treatment (i.e.
afer being pumped into a sedimentation tank where some solid waste settles out),
the remaining pollutants, called "secondary waste load", are subjected to secondary treatment (breakdown by bacteria) in order to cut down on BOD. Accordingly,
the amount of secondary waste load determines the amount and cost of secondary
treatment sufficient to meet the BOD limitation.
' 590 F.2d at 1029.
' Id. at 1030. In his argument, the agency's counsel attempted to explain
why the secondary waste load standard had been modified. The court stated, "it
is for this reason (i.e. failure to permit public comment on the modified standard)
that we take no solace in the fact that counsel, after the fact, may be able to convincingly rationalize the agency's decision."
Id. at 1031.
II 8 OSHC at 1810.
,' 598 F.2d at 637.
590 F.2d at 1031.
' E.g., American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
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example, in American Iron and Steel Institute v. OHSA,"2 dealing with OHSA's standards for reducing employees' exposure to
coke oven emissions, petitioners objected to the inclusion of noncoke oven employees, specifically independent contractors, because they were not mentioned in the notice as a class of persons
to be protected.' Judge Rossen, writing for the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, was convinced that the notice was sufficient
to include independent contractors,' but held that "in a matter
of such vital importance ...

we find it difficult to conclude that

the notice given to the coke producers constituted notice of the
proposed standards to the non-coke-oven employers.""' Had the
final rule not had such a significant effect, it is safe to assume
that the court would have held the notice to be sufficient.1" The
impact of the final regulation was also determinative of the
court's decision in the State of Maryland v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency."7 Petitioners successfully argued that EPA's
notice was insufficient to inform the parties that employer mass
transit incentive provisions were being considered as a means of
eliminating automobile pollution.'48 The court stated, "in light of
the drastic impact which compliance with regulations such as
this will have . . . adherence to the statutory provision is

necessary."'49

The development of this rationale could be significant in the
development of environmental and safety and health law where
administrative agency rules normally have a dramatic impact.
Reviewing courts might begin to require more specific notice of
proposed rules, and the listing of specific industries and trade
1978), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 38 (1980); State of Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215,

22 (4th Cir. 1975).

. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 38 (1980).
"

"

577 F.2d at 830.
d. at 840.

5 d. The judge's reasoning is somewhat confusing, inasmuch as he did
believe that the notice was sufficient to logically include independent contractors.
Thus, it appears that when the court is in doubt, the substantial impact test can
be applied.
14" Id.

7 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1976); Cf Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d
495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) ("Because of the nature of the regulations and their drastic
impact, such opportunity might well include the right to more than merely have
the opportunity to comment.").
141530 F.2d at 222.
149 Id
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organizations even though a more generalized notice could reasonably be read to include them. This would change the courts'
general reasoning that the notice is sufficient "if it apprises the
public of the subject of the rulemaking," rather than requiring
that groups reasonably expected to be affected by the rule be
named." 0
For example, the "substantial impact" principle could have
been applied in United States Steel Workers v. Marshall,"'
where the final rule was a major importance.'' The court
reasoned that from a proper reading of the proposed rule,"' industries could reasonably have inferred that OHSA might lower
the proposed air borne lead standard," even though OHSA did
not specifically state that it was considering any alternative permissible lead standards.' 5 The court could have relied on
American Iron and Steel Institute, 6 and remanded the rule for
a new notice and comment period for those who in good faith
failed to comment upon the proposed rule after the original
notice was given." 7 Judge Wright, writing for the majority, 8
and Judge MacKinnon,"' in his dissent, cited American Iron and
Steel Institute but did not refer to the "substantial impact"
language contained therein.
Judge MacKinnon asserted that the notice was insufficient,
and was flawed by the agencies' failure to give notice that it was
considering a lower lead standard.' The majority recognized
the impact of the rule, but were convinced that the lower lead
standard was supported by substantial evidence 6' and that addi"' See H.R. Rep. No. 1980, supra note 57, at 258.
"'

8 OSHC at 1831.

,52Id. at 1828.
Id. at 1828.
' See notes 106, 107 supra and accompanying text.
" See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
577 F.2d at 840.
"' See notes 111-113 supra and accompanying text.
' 8 OSHA at 1835.
' 8 OSHA at 1905; see also note 110 supra.
8 OSHA at 1905.
8 OSHA at 1858. OSHA's rulemaking decisions must be supported by
"substantial evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). Unless otherwise required by
statute, decisions in rulemaking need only be "rationally" based. See Gifford,
Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling toward a New Paradigm, 32
Ad. L. Rev. 577, 582 (1980). See also Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185-87 (1974).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

tional comments would not have altered OHSA's final rule.1 2
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the "substantial impact" principle will be adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
III.

THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF VERMONT YANKEE
NUCLEAR POWER CORP. V. NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., AND
THE "HARD LOOK" DOCTRINE ON THE
NOTICE REQUIREMENT

The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci4 Inc.'63 precludes the federal courts from requiring additional informal
rulemaking procedures which exceed those required by the Administrative Procedure Act.' Prior to Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp., the federal courts often suspended final agency
rules to permit limited cross examination of important witnesses,'6 5 to require agencies to make more detailed statements
'6' See notes 118, 119 supra and accompanying text.
'

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

Id. at 548. For possible exceptions to the holding, see note 194 infra. The
holding in Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense
Council Inc. has prompted voluminous comment. The following are representative
samples: Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Bryse, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978); McGinley, Vermont
Yankee wu the Evolution of Administrative Procedure:Additional Reflections
and Comments, 1 MIsS. COL. L. REV. 257 (1979); Note, The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969 and NuclearPower Plant Licensing: JudicialModification
of Agency Rulemaking-Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 666 (1977); Comment, Implementing
the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act Through Rulemaking: The Implications
of Natural Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 148 (1977); Comment, Judicial Review of Generic Rulemaking: The Experience of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 65 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1977). On the
administrative procedures involved in nuclear power plant licensing, see Note,
The Use of GenericRulemaking to Resolve the EnvironmentalIssue in Nuclear
Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869 (1975); Comment, AEC Rulemaking
and Public Participation,62 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1974). On the general subject of environmental law, see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977).
11 International Harvester v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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of the bases and purposes 167of their decisions, 6' or to reply to
critical comments received.
Although the Supreme Court clearly foreclosed the right to
cross examination, 6 ' it is unclear whether the latter two options
exercised by the lower courts have been eliminated. The court
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. held that the administrative agency's decision must be supported by the record.'69
Two methods by which the reviewing court can compel the agency
to compile a more complete record are to remand the rule for a
more complete statement of the agency's rationale for its decision, and to require the agency to respond to critical comments
received during the rulemaking process.17 1 It is highly unlikely
" Automotive Parts and Accessories v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330-38 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
'8Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cerL
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). For a more comprehensive list of procedural
"hybrids" imposed on the agencies by the courts, see Rogers, A Hard Look at
Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L. REV.
699, 704 & n.39 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Rogers, Hard Look Doctrine].
'" See United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC at 1832-34, (citing
Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Corp.) dismissed petitioner's claim that he had a
right to cross examination.
.. 435 U.S. at 549. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). (In an informal adjudication procedure the court held that, by
APA standard, the Secretary of Transportation had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. The reviewing court must conduct "a thorough, probing, indepth
review" and must make a "searching and careful" inquiry into the facts.) Id. at
415-16. The courts have applied the Citizens to Preserve Overton Park standard
to informal rulemaking, requiring a more extensive record of the proceedings.
See Wright, Commentary: Rulemaking and JudicialReview, 30 Ad. L. Rev. 461,
465 (1978).
Informal adjudication procedures are "hybrids" in the sense that they cannot
formally be classified as informal rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), or formal rulemaking procedures 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(e). For an analysis of informal adjudication procedures see Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,43
U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1975-76). One of the criticisms of Vermont Yankee is that it
has created strict bipolar administrative procedures. The rulemaking process is
either formal or informal, with no intertwining of the two. Verkuil, The Emerging
Concept of AdministrativeProcedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 322 (1978) (commentary calls for liberal use of oral presentation, for cross-examination on specific
issues and greater blending of formal and informal rulemaking procedures); Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm,
32 AD. L. REV. 577, 612 (1980) (suggests that all rulemaking review be on the
record and that a more unified approach is needed to blurr the distinction between formal and informal rulemaking).
"I See Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Pro-
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after Vermont Yankee, however, that the reviewing court can
"command" the agency to follow a particular procedure. There it
was stated that, "the court should engage in this kind of review
[of the record] and not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its
own notion of which procedures are 'best' .... "'"
Professor Stewart argues that the decision in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. is self-contradictory because of the
Court's recognition that the reviewing court should base its
decision upon the record."' As a result, courts will on occasion
have to remand the rule to the agency for development of a
more complete record even though the agency fully complied
1 3
with the APA requirements. 1
Regardless of the friction which the Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. ruling has created between the scholars
and the courts, the decision in no way impedes the federal
judiciary's power to remand cases where the original notice of
proposed rulemaking is insufficient.""' Although the decision
precludes informal rulemaking hybrids, it is still the court's
function to determine whether the basic requirements of the
APA have been met.7 5 Remand for additional notice and comment also has the dual effect of creating a more complete rulemaking record and providing for a more critical examination of
the agency's decision."' The remand for additional notice and
comment, however, may be subject to abuse. Having this authority to remand, without violating the ruling of Vermont Yankee

cedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1812 (1978). [hereinafter referred to as Stewart,
Vermont Yankee].
171See 435 U.S. at 549.
1
Stewart, Vermont Yankee, supra note 170, at 1816. It has traditionally
not been required that the agency's final decision be based on a carefully
"delimited record". Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L.
REV. 185, 186; Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward
A New Paradigm,32 AD. L. REV. 557, 548 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Gifford, A New Paradigm] (drafters of the APA assumed that judicial review of
regulations promulgated informally would be "undetailed").
" Stewart, Vermont Yankee, supra note 170 at 1816.
17. See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979).
175 Id
"' See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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Nuclear Power Corp., one can envision an instance where the
court, unable to impose additional procedures which it deems
necessary, will remand the entire agency proceeding for a new
round of additional notice and comment.'7 7 Moreover, in the past,
when permitting cross examination or some other procedure
was perceived to be a more expedient method of testing the rationality of the final rule and assuring fairness to all parties,
courts may not have felt compelled to remand for additional
notice and comment. It is unlikely, however, that courts will unnecessarily compel new notice and comment periods; judges are
certainly aware of and sensitive to the consequences of prolonged
administrative proceedings. 7 1 When remand for a new additional
notice and comment period is unjustified, the courts will more
than likely follow the suggestions of Professors Williams and
Bryse: "The reviewing court should point out the problem with
the agency's decision and allow the agency to utilize whatever
procedures it deems appropriate to ventilate the issues.' 7 9
The court's decision as to whether to remand for a new
notice of proposed rulemaking has been aligned with the "hard
look" doctrine.' The "hard look" doctrine is used by the courts
when the consequences of the agency's rule, if approved, will be
significant. It is normally employed when the courts have to
grapple with difficult environmental, health and safety regulations.' As one commentator has explained, "the 'hard look' doctrine has been used to examine the record for agency reactions
to presentations made by participants in rulemaking and to
eliminate the possibility that the agency has relied upon a
crystal ball to resolve tough questions."'8 There is, of course, a
certain tension-between the "hard look" doctrine and the Ver" See generally International Harvester v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) and note 165 supra and accompanying text.
See Wright, Court of Appeals Review, supra note 3, at 204.
,nBryse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure:
A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1827 (1978) [hereinafter
referrred to as Bryse, Somewhat Different View] (quoting Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act, A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 42 U. CAL. L. REV. 401, 454-55 (1975)).
'" Rogers, Hard Look Doctrine, supra note 167, at 706 & n.55.
'7'

See note 167, at 704 supra.

Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 237
,12
[hereinafter Verkuil, JudicialReview].
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mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. decision, since federal courts
have used the "hard look" doctrine to add administrative procedures which exceed the APA requirements.183 Although the
Supreme Court has foreclosed the "procedural hybrid" option, it
has adopted the theory that both the courts and agencies must
take a "hard look" at the consequences of rulemaking.'84
The relationship between the "hard look" doctrine and the
notice requirement must be analyzed in light of the three "essential ingredients" of the "hard look" doctrine. Applying this
doctrine, the court first reviews the substance of the agency's
operative statute as written by Congress, to determine whether
the agency acted within the scope of its assigned discretion.'85 In
the notice of proposed rulemaking, the agency is required to
specify the statute under which it is acting. As was stated previously, the notice requirement stimulates the decision making
process in informal rulemaking. Therefore, the agency, knowing
that the court will carefully, scrutinize its statutory authority,
will be compelled to carefully draft the notice so as to convince
the reviewing court that it has proceeded within the bounds of
that authority. The second ingredient of the "hard look" doctrine is procedural in nature. 8 ' Inasmuch as the "hard look" doctrine evolved within the area of administrative law, it does not
theoretically apply to the court's review of the sufficiency of
notice. The court has always had the responsibility of carefully
examining the proposed notice and determining whether it complies with the APA standards.'87 The application of this doctrine
to the notice issue is more subtle; it is equivalent to the "substantial impact"'88 principle discussed previously. When the effect of the final rule will be substantial, and there is a
reasonable doubt at to the sufficiency of the notice, either the
"hard look" doctrine or the "substantial impact" principle may
be applied by the court to justify ordering a new round of notice
18 Rogers, Hard Look Doctrine, supra note 167 at 708.

KIeppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citation omitted).
Id at 705. E.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 99 S. Ct. 824 (1979) (FCC
lacked authority to require cable television operators to allow free access to certain channels by the public).
18

"u

18 Id.

" See notes 59-61 supra and case cited therein.
See notes 141-57 supra and accompanying text.

1"
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and comment.'89 Viewed analytically, however, a judicial remand
for an additional notice which fully discloses the data upon
which the agency's decision was based, is similar in its effect to
application of the "hard look" doctrine, in which the agency is
ordered to compile a more complete record for the reviewing
court. 13 The "substantial impact" principle is applied when the
final agency rule incorporates an unexpected group or industry,
or when there is a substantial deviation from the proposed
rule. 191
The third and most important component of the "hard look"
doctrine is the court's requirement that an agency's promulgated rule be a product of reasoned decision making. 9 ' Depending on the agency's operational statute, the decision must be rationally based upon or supported by substantial evidence.193 A
full and adequate notice of the proposed rule is obviously one
way in which the agency may begin the process of reasoned decision making.' The notice of a rule dealing with an important
'" The trend toward requiring additional notices of proposed rules has
already begun to prompt judicial commentary. The late Judge Harold Leventhal,
in his remarks to a symposium on procedural trends in administrative law, stated:
The first [trend that has evolved] is that when the agency finally
comes up with a rule that is quite different from that which was set
forth in the notice and also quite different from that which any person
suggested, basic fairness requires some opportunity for comment on the
newly proposed revision. And this had given rise to what is now not
unknown and almost widespread in agency practice, the second round of
notice and comment.
However, the courts in their infinite mercy have only required two
rounds ....
Those cases do not say that the rule is defective when it
does not provide for a second round of notice and comment .... [WIhat
they say-most notably the ones I've written-is that the court cannot
intelligently exercise its functioning review unless it knows what the
agency's position is on the point that is being raised by petitioner.
Leventhal, Improving the AdministrativeProcess-Time For a New APA?, 32 AD.
L. REv. 287, 291-92. But see 8 OSHC 1810 (1980) (rule upheld although not one
comment was received on the change in the rule). For an example of a remand for
new rounds of notice and comment ordered by Judge Leventhal, see Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
921 (1974) (case remanded for new round of notice and comment because the data
upon which the rule was based was not revealed adequately to interested parties).
i See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d at 393.
'9' See notes 141-57 supra and accompanying text.
192 Rogers, Hard Look Doctrine, supra note 167, at 705.
"9 Gifford, A New Paradigm,supra note 172, at 580-84.
.9 See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
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issue should prompt useful and critical comments upon which
the agency may rely in reaching a rational decision.' Courts encourage agencies to incorporate reasonable suggestions in the
final rule. 9 ' When a notice is designed so as to stimulate
substantial public comment, and when the final rule reflects
those comments, the rule is more likely to be the product of
reasoned decision making, and thus better able to withstand the
close scrutiny of the courts.197
IV.

THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., the Supreme
Court ruled that in the absence of any constitutional constraints,
the basic procedures provided for in the APA99 were sufficient
99
to satisfy due process requirements in informal rulemaking
0
9
The decision came as a shock to many academicians
and
judges 0 ' who preceived that additional procedures were
2
sometimes necessary to "ventilate""
critical issues in a fair
manner. Underlying their perception was the belief that additional procedures were likely to result in the formulation of a
"' E.g., Association of Am. Railroads v. Adams, 485 F. Supp. 1877, 1884 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). "Agency's use of fuller procedure formulation in complex cases will
tend to assure the reviewing court that the decision-maker has acted in an even
handed and rational manner." Hahn, Administrative Decision-Making,supra note
30, at 508.
"' See, e.g., cases cited note 64 supra.
Ia "It should be noted that the procedure does not assure that the resulting
decision will be rational. Rather, the procedure increases the probability that the
decision will be rational and responsive to the relevant information presented."
Hahn, Administrative Decision-making, supra note 30, at 508 n.204.
lS 435 U.S. 519.
a The court, in acknowledging exceptions to its holding, cited Bi-metalic

Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizations, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). The court in Bimetalic Inv. Co. recognized that when a smaller number of people is exceptionally
affected, they have a right to a public hearing (citing Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 385 (1908)). The Bi-metalic Inv. Co. case is important since Justice
Holmes rules that the constitution did not require a public hearing for the adoption of rules that apply to a large number of people. Thus, one excep tion to Vermont Yankee arises- when a rule promulgated by an agency applied only to a
small class of people. The second exception is when the statute requires that the
rulemaking proceedings be "on the record" after opportunity for an "agency hearing". United States v. Florida East Coast R.R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237 (1973).
E.g., Rogers, Hard Look Doctrine, supra note 167, at 699.
" E.g., McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking, 53 TUL. L. REV. 81 (1978-79).
1 Stewart, Vermont Yankee, supra note 170, at 1806.
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more reasoned decision and that the country had historically
relied upon the courts to insure that administrative laws would
not be enacted without due process safeguards."' Others, however, applauded the court's decision. They believe that the enactment of procedures in addition to those contained in the APA
20 5
4
is within the exclusive province of Congress" or the agency.
As Justice Rehnquist recently stated in a case following Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.:
It is within the agency's discretion to afford the parties more
procedures but it is not within the province of the courts to do
so. In Vermont Yankee we recognized that the APA is 'a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come
to rest.' Courts upset that balance when they override informed
choice of procedures and impose obligations not required by the
APA.O
The debate over the fairness of administrative procedures is
not a recent development. Professor Verkuil, in his historical assessment of administrative procedure, stated:
Administrative procedure has been struggling to find
recognition and respectability since the beginning of the twentieth century. The obstacle was, and to some extent still is, a
perception among judges, lawyers, and legislators that the adversary system is the only legitimate way to make decisions in
our society. This point of view is held most strongly by those
who oppose the substance of the government regulations to
which administrative procedures attach ....

Some who accept

the basis for regulation, however, instinctively fear that displacing adversary procedures will lead to procedures that are inherently arbitrary and oppressive ....

This fear should have

been allayed by the enactment of the APA. The APA was premised on the notions that (1) what agencies did was not inherently arbitrary and (2) general procedure guidelines in rulemaking and adjudication would be adequate to assure fairness.'
As Professor Verkuil suggests, however, the debate over administrative procedural fairness has not come to an end. In fact,

Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"I Bryse, A Somewhat Different View, supra note 179, at 1829.
215 Id. at 1824, 1831.
21 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312, 313 (1981).
m' Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,78 COLM.
L. REV. 258, 278-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil, The Emerging Concept].
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he is one of the strongest proponents of modifying the APA to
improve informal rulemaking procedures.2"' Verkuil has analyzed
the need for change with reference to the three normative concepts of administrative procedure: 1) overall fairness to the parties and accuracy of decisions, 2) efficient and low cost resolution
of the issues, and 3) participant satisfaction with the process.",
Because agencies which have adopted the practice of issuing
more than two rounds of notice have not suggested that it has
impeded their administrative mandate,"0 this is one simple way
to increase fairness, efficiency, and participant satisfaction in
the administrative process.2 ' Otherwise, participants who perceive that their due process rights have been violated by "legally
adequate notices," eventually become dissatisfied with the
system and lose confidence in administrative procedures. Given
the broad procedural discretion provided by Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp.21' and its predecessor, United States v.
Florida East Coast Railroad Co.,2' it would not be unduly
burdensome to require agencies to give additional notices when
they are contemplating substantial changes between the
original and the final rule.
Agencies, through internal mechanisms, could gauge the sufficiency of the notice by the content of the comments they
receive. If the comments do not generally reflect a perception of
the agency's contemplated action, it could publish a more detailed
notice of the proposed rule."4 Agencies have recognized that in
m For one of Professor Verkuil's suggestions see note 169 supra.
For avcomplete list see supra note 169, at 320-29.
Id. at 279.
210 Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking, supra note 10, at 450-51.
"' See generally RegulatoryReform Legislation:Hearings on S. 262, S. 755,
S. 445, S. 93, before the Committee on Government Affairs, United States
Senate, 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Douglas Costle, Administrator, EPA).
2,' 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
213 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
I"4 When analyzing the sufficiency of the notice, judges often refer to the
number of comments received on a specific proposal. See Forester v. CPSC, 559
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States Steel Workers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810
(1981). The Commissioner of the FDA, however, in giving notice of a proposed
rule designed to expand public participation in rulemaking, said that recommendations will be judged by their quality, not by the quantity received. The Commissioner referred to the common practice of persons who, in an effort to oppose
the rule, encourage other people to mail in form letters. 40 Fed. Reg. 22,950
(1975).
109
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some instances it is necessary to go beyond the requirements of
the APA to insure fair public participation in the rulemaking
process." ' The EPA, in its promulgation of rules under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, allows for two rounds of
notice and comment. Prior to the publication of the proposed
rule, the EPA provides interested persons with the technical
analysis of the issues. Public comments are invited, and afterwards the notice of the proposed rule is published along with
EPA's own draft report in which it tries to substantiate its position." 6 The FAA2"7 and CAB 8 also give advanced notices of the
proposed rulemaking. These advanced notices suggest issues
21 9
which need to be resolved, and invite public comment thereon.
The FDA has been particularly innovative in permitting
greater public participation in the rulemaking process. The FDA
invites the public to petition its commissioner to promulgate certain regulations.2 2 If the commissioner believes that the petitioner's suggestion is worthy of a proposed rule, he may in his
discretion issue for publication two or more alternative proposals on the same subject and ask for comments on both of
them. 21 When the commissioner is uncertain whether the suggested rule justifies a proposal, he may issue notice of the petition and 2request comments with respect to the merits of the
22
petition.
Congress has enacted statutes requiring regulatory agencies
to use additional procedures not required by the APA. 2' Legislation has been passed to compel the EPA, in some instances, to
issue a new round of notice and comment when it contemplates
215 Williams,

Hybrid Rulemaking, supra note 10, at 450. See Weyerhauser v.

Costle, 590 F.2d at 1011, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (4 rounds of notice and comment);

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (three rounds of notice and
comment).
21I Williams, supra note 10 at 450.
217Id. at 451 & n.237; 39 Fed. Reg. 45044 (Dec 30, 1974).
2,1 Williams, supra note 10 at 451 & n.237. 37 Fed. Reg. 15518 (Aug 3, 1972).
219 Williams, supra note 10 at 451 & n.237.
40 Fed. Reg. 22,950 (1975).

221 Id.
222Id.

See Hamilton, The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative
Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1315 (1972) (discusses various hybrid procedures which Congress has attached to the operative statutes of regulatory
agencies).
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that the final rule will deviate substantially from the proposed
one.' Many agencies are required to hold public hearings22 and
to consult with advisory committees before issuing the final
rule. 6 For example, OSHA promulgated a rule designed to improve ground fault circuit protection in the construction industry. On an appeal to the Court,' the rule was remanded to
OHSA for further consideration because of failure to comply
with a statute requiring it is consult with an advisory committee
before promulgating the rule. 8
The Consumer Product Safety Act 9 is striking in that it
contains numerous variant procedures which go beyond the
minimal requirements of the APA. The notice of the proposed
rule must identify the product and the risk of injury associated
with its use. To avoid overlapping of regulations the agency
must specify existing rules which might be relevant in establishing the proposed one and also invite persons, states, or other
federal regulatory agencies to submit an existing standard
which would suffice as the proposed rule. Moreover, the statute
contains an unique provision whereby persons may offer to
develop the proposed standard."0
If an interested person offers to develop the standard,2' and
the Commission finds him technically competent to do so, it
must publish the name and address of the person, and a summary of the terms of the offer accepted. Of course, notice is provided and an opportunity to participate in the development of
23
the standards is given to interested persons.

See code sections cited note 85 supra.

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1976) (OSHA required to give an oral hearing upon
request).
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1 2) (1976) (OSHA required to consult with the National
Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health before promulgating a
final rule).

581 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 967, 968. The Secretary of OSHA did not have to follow the recommendations of the advisory committee; he must, however, submit the rule for
recommendations. Id. at 968.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051(A)-2051(D)i & ii, § 2056(2)(c)(1)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
Id. § 2056(b)(1).
Id § (d)(1).
22Id.
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If the agency decides to develop the standard on its own,m it
must follow all of the informal rulemaking requirements of the
APA.24 Upon request by a member of the public, however, the
agency must allow oral presentation of views on the proposed
rule.S Once the Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) analyzes all the information gathered, and
decides upon the substance of the regulation, he must (1) include
in the promulgation of the final rule certain findings with
respect to the degree and nature of the risk of injury which the
rule is designed to eliminate or reduce, (2) name the number of
products or class of products subject to the rule, (3) analyze the
consequences of the rule and (4) examine means for achieving
compliance with the standard without adversely affecting competition or disrupting manufacturing." Under the basis requirements of the APA, most agencies need only give a statement of the basis and purpose of the final rule. Under this
statute, the Commissioner of the CPSC must give a comprehensive analysis of the basis and purpose of the rule, a notice of the
proposed rule and a "mini" impact statement published in the
final rule. The Commissioner is thus required to do a considerable amount of analytical research concerning the proposed rule
throughout the rulemaking process in order to comply with the
statute. As a result, the impact of any rule promulgated by the
CPSC is measured and re-measured with considerable care.
V.

REFORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES TO
PROVIDE FOR A MORE ADEQUATE NOTICE
OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

Each president, since Richard Nixon, has sought to control
the regulatory process of the executive agencies. Former Presidents Nixon and Ford required the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to perform a "quality of life" review of significant
Commissioner has the discretion to accept or reject an offer within 30
days after notice of the proposed rule is given. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(e)(1) (1976 & Supp.

III 1980).
' Id at § 2058(a)(2) (1976).
Id, Commissioner must also consider the special needs of the handicapped
to the extent that they may be adversely affected by the promulgation of a rule.

15 U.S.C. § 2058(b)(2) (1976).
1 Id. at § 2057(c)(1}(A(D).
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environmental regulations. 27 Ford also required that an "inflationary impact statement" be made prior to the promulgation of
new regulations. 8 President Carter, however, went further
than any of his predecessors by introducing, via executive order,
a number of regulatory reforms that not only required a form of
review and economic analysis of proposed regulations, but imposed new informal rulemaking procedures on executive agencies." 9 Many of these reforms were incorporated in Reagan's Executive Order 1229.1" For example, the agencies must publish
semi-annually an agenda of "major" 241 regulations under develop"'Quality of life"' review by OMB during the Nixon Administration was
blamed for undermining many environmental regulations. Verkuil, Jawboning
Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COL. L.
Rov. 943, 949 (citing Office of Management and Budget Plans CriticalPart in EnvironmentalPolicymaking, 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 693 (1976)).
' Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 203 (1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. §
1904 (1976).
21
Exec. Order No. 12044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1979) revoked by President
Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
Because of unfavorable public response, Carter decided not to include independent regulatory agencies in the executive order. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,670 (1978).
One commentator has asserted that the President has the constitutional power to
impose additional rulemaking procedures on independent agencies. See Verkuil,
Ex Parte Contacts, supra note 237, at 948 & n. 28 (citing Bruff, Presidential
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 498-99 (1979)). President Reagan, however, specifically excluded independent agencies from his executive order.
The Carter Administration's Regulation Reform Act S.755, included many
of the procedural reforms contained in the former President's executive order S.
755 which failed to gain Congressional approval, would have applied to independent regulatory agencies. The Bill was based, in part, on recommendations made
by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee which in 1975 conducted a comprehensive review of governmental regulations. Carter's bill was designed to improve the regulatory process within the system. Its major goals were to 1) improve the analytical ability of the agencies, 2) improve agency procedures, 3)
enhance public input into the process. See Wegman, Improving the Administrative Process-Time for a New APA?, 32 AD. L. REv. 287, 297 (1980)
(Symposium Remarks). [hereinafter cited as Wegman, Time For a New APA?].
For a full discussion of Senate Bills designed to improve agency rulemaking procedures see, Regulatory Reform Legislation:Hearings on S.262, S.755, S.445, S.
93 before the Committee on Government Affairs, United States Senate 1st Sess.
(1979) [hereinafter referred to as Reform Legislative Hearings]. The speakers invited to testify before the Committee were generally supportive of some type of
legislation to amend the APA.
40 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
241 A major regulation is defined

as having an annual effect on the economy
of $100 million or more, causes major increases in costs on prices, or has significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, in-
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ment or review and draft more informative notices of proposed
rules, supplemented by preliminary and final regulatory analyses.
The publication of the regulatory agenda serves as an "early
warning" devise to alert the public federal rulemaking activity,242
while the economic analysis provides the public with an estimate
of the social and economic consequences of new regulations. The
analyses must also identify the anticipated costs, benefits of,
and less costly alternatives to proposed regulations.
Though these similarities are important, there are some
very conceptual differences between the Carter and Reagan executive orders. The Reagan order mandates that the "potential
benefit to society" outweigh the potential cost of any new governmental regulation.243 Reagan's "Regulatory Impact Statement" places more emphasis on identifying the benefits and
costs of new regulations. Moreover, the agency must explain the
legal basis for rejecting less expensive regulations. Although
Carter required an explanation for choosing one rule over
another, the decision could be based on factors other than legal
ones.
The form of review of a proposed regulation required is the
major difference between the two administrations. Carter required the head of each agency to approve the promulgation of
any significant rule,244 but Reagan has returned the responsibility to the Director of OMB.245 Carter's review plan was based on
the supposition that top agency officials were more sensitive to
comments and criticisms concerning a proposed rule. The former
President's aides charged that lower level agency officials, who
often drafted the proposed rules, were committed to keeping
them in their vestigal form.24 Therefore, the problem became a

novation, or on the ability of United States based enterprises to compete with
foreign-based enterpries in domestic or export markets. Exec. Order No. 12291,
46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
2 Another purpose of the regulatory agenda under the Carter Administration was to identify overlapping and conflicting upcoming rules and regulations.
Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program:An Overview, 32
AD. L. REV. 129, 139 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Neustadt, Regulatory Reform].
2 Recall that the administrator of OSHA suspended the implementation of
regulations to limit worker exposure to lead until a costlbenefit analysis was completed.
"' Exec. Order No. 12077.
2 Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
244 Neustadt, Regulatory Reform, supra note 242.
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lack of change rather than a substantive change in the final rule.
This resulted in inflexible decision making, a state of affairs inimical to the rulemaking process.
The OMB review required by Reagan will provide the executive branch with more direct control over the executive
branch with more direct control over the promulgation of new
regulations. The OMB review by the Reagan administration will
differ from that of the Nixon and Ford administrations because
it encompasses all major regulations proposed by executive
agencies.
Despite the differences in the type of administrative review
of regulations, the continuation of the regulatory agenda, identification of major rules, the publication of a summary of
regulatory analyses will provide the public with important information. This information should stimulate more knowledgeable
public input in the regulatory process and better coordinate
regulatory policies. 47
Other major recommendations for procedural reform have
2 48
come from the Administrative Conference of the United States.
In 1976, the Conference made specific recommendations with respect to how the agencies could better inform the public of the
substantive issues raised in informal rulemaking. The Conference suggested that "each agency should decide in light of
the circumstances of a particular proceeding whether or not to
provide procedural protections going beyond those of 5 U.S.C. §
553. 219 Circumstances which might prompt the agency to "tack
on" procedures exceeding the requirements of the APA were
described as follows:
247

The Reagan Executive Order did delete some of the Carter Administra-

tion's suggestions for procedural reform such as publication of advance notices of
proposed rulemaking, providing notices of proposed rules to publications likely to
be read by persons who might be affected by the rules and notifying directly persons who certainly would be affected. Carter had also expanded the notice and
comment period to 60 days, Exec. Order No. 12044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1979).
218

The Administrative Law Conference of the United States is an indepen-

dent Federal Agency established by the Administrative Conference Act of 1964, 5
U.S.C. §§ 57-576. (1976). The purpose of the Conference is "to identify the causes
of inefficiency, delay, unfairness, in administrative proceedings affecting private

rights, and to recommend improvements to the President, the agencies, the Congress and the courts." Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendations and Reports 3 (1976-77).
, Administrative Conference of the United States, 1976 Report 43-47

(1976-77).
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[When] (1) the scientific, technical, or other data relevant to the
proposed rule are complex; (2) the problem posed is so openended that an agency may profit from receiving diverse public
views before publishing a proposed rule for final comment; and
(3) the costs that errors in the rule may impose, including
health, welfare, and environmental losses imposed on the public
and pecuniary expenses imposed on the affected industries and
consumers of their products, are significant.'
The specific additional procedures suggested in the recommendations include:
1. Providing from the outset for the possibility of two cycles
of notice and comment when the agency anticipates that the
issues will be unusually complex, as when the notice of proposed
rulemaking is expressed in general terms.
2. Providing for a second cycle of comment when comments
filed or the agency's response to such comments present important new issues or serious conflicts of data.
3. Incorporating in the notice a summary of the agency's attitudes toward the critical issues in the proceeding and a
description of the data on which the agency relies.
4. Providing an explanation of the tests and other procedures
utilized by the agency and a statement of the significance the
agency has attached to them.
5. Holding conferences with interested groups to resolve, narrow, or clarify disputed issues.
6. Hearing argument or other oral presentation at which agency officials may ask questions, including questions submitted by
interested persons.
7. Allowing cross-examination to resolve specific issues of fact
when the agency considers that to be appropriate.
The recommendation concluded with the following admonition:
An agency should employ any of [these] devices . . . or permit cross-examination only to the extent that it believes that
the anticipated costs (including those related to increasing the
time involved and the deployment of additional agency resources) are offset by anticipated gains in the quality of the rule
and in the extent to which the rulemaking procedure will be
perceived as having been fair."'
2
Administrative Law Conference of the United States, Recommendations
and Reports 66-67 (1970-72). The circumstances quoted above were incorporated
by reference in the 1976 Report of the Conference.
21 Bryse, A Somewhat Different View, supra note 179, at 1852, (citing Administrative Conference of the United States, 1976 Report 43-47 (1976-77)).
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Judging from the content of the Conference's suggestions for
improving rulemaking procedures, the notice component was
deemed extremely important. The first six recommendations
were exclusively designed to better inform rulemaking participants about the proposed rule and the agencies' contemplated action. The recommendations made by the Conference
explicitly recognize the necessity of having a full and viable
notice and comment period before a final rule is promulgated by
the agency. Moreover, it appears from the analysis of the cases
in Part II that employment of the "early warning" notice of proposed rulemaking and the second round of notice and commentary may have prevented litigation over the notice issue. An advanced notice of a proposed rule should better inform the public
of the substance of the proposed rule while additional notices
should reduce the "shock" resulting when the final rule significantly differs from the proposed one. If these procedural devices
do work, delays in promulgating rules will actually be reduced;
there will be fewer court-ordered remands for additional notice
and comment, and fewer remands for development of more complete informal rulemaking records.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXTERNAL CONTROLS
EXCEEDING THOSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Congress is presently debating various bills that would
place constraints beyond those contained in the Administrative
Procedure Act on agency actions.252 The legislative veto would
suspend rules promulgated by agencies for 30 to 60 days until
one of the houses of Congress vetoes it or lets it stand.25 3 Former
President Carter vigorously opposed the legislative veto, claiming that it would undermine the constitutional division of
powers by having Congress execute laws as well as make
them.' Supporters of the bill argue that Congress has delegated
too much law-making authority to the agencies, and that the
legislative veto is one way to regain control over the administrative process.25
Wegman, Time for a New APA? supra note 239, at 300.
Id See Adkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en
banc) (per curiam) (plurality opinion) (majority upheld one-house veto in Federal
Salary Act of 1967 against constitutional attack).
I Neustadt, The Administration'sRegulatory Reform Program,supra note
246, at 146.
1 See Roger, HardLook Doctrine,supra note 167, at 703.
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Another bill, sponsored by Senator Dale Bumpers and
known as the Federal Court Improvement Act, 6 would subject
final rules to more stringent judicial review. Under this bill all
of the presumptions in favor of a rule promulgated by the agency
would be eliminated. The rule would also have to be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 This would require a
more comprehensive record of the rulemaking proceedings." 8
Opponents of the bill argue that "preponderance of the evidence"
language will lead to de novo review of the agency action by the
reviewing court. 9
The Commission on Law and Economy, sponsored by the
American Bar Association, 8 ' has recommended that Congress
enact a statute permitting the President to direct both executive and independent agencies to consider or reconsider the
issuance of new regulations, and allowing the President to
modify regulations inimical to the well being of the nation. 61
This limited control of federal agencies by the President has
gained the support of the Honorable Henry J. Friendly, who is
certainly no stranger to administrative law. He has stated that:
Each agency has a devotion to its primary purpose; it will
continue to have this no matter how many statutes are amended
to say that it shall 'consider' other interests as well. Someone in
government, and in the short run that someone can only be the
President, must have power to make agencies work together
rather than push their own special concerns to the point that
the country becomes ungovernable." 2
The President's authority to control administrative actions,
however, is limited. He is only authorized to rely on factors
96 Cong. Rec. S12145 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979).
The late Judge Leventhal interpreted the proposed Bumpers Amendment
as a mandate by Congress to compel judges to scrutinize more carefully the
substantive rulemaking issues. Leventhal, Time For a New APA?, supra note
237, at 294.
2Id.

=' Wegman, Time for a New APA?, supra note 239, at 301. Wegman states
that he is confused as to what is meant by a preponderance of the evidence in informal rulemaking. He wonders whether the proceedings will be conducted on an
adversarial basis, with trial-type hearings, and full opportunity for parties to

cross-examine witnesses.
211See ABA Commission on Law and Economy,
TO REFORM (1979) [hereinafter cited as ROAD

Id. at 79.

FEDERAL REGULATION: ROAD
TO REFORM].

Separate statement of J. Friendly, id. at 163.
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which the agency is authorized to consider, and may only control
national policies when the agency's statutory charter is broad.
Furthermore, the President's action must be published in the
Federal Register, in the form of an Executive Order explaining
why the Order is necessary.2
Of the three "oversight" proposals, the Presidential one is
most directly related to the notice issue. The President could
order the agency to reopen the record. The President could
publish a notice in the Federal Register informing the public of
his intention to issue an executive order concerning a proposed
or promulgated rule." 4 The public would be allowed thirty days
to submit comments, and all comments would be subject to
public inspection." 5
The effect of the legislative veto would be more subtle. Congress might be more responsive to protests that the content of
the proposed rule was insufficient to alert the public about the
contemplated regulation. This is not to suggest that the courts
are less sensitive to procedural complaints, but rather that Congress might take into account political considerations not normally addressed by the court. The intense, subjective pleas of
business or environmental groups are permitted to be heard in
the halls of Congress, but the court's review of the agencies' actions is limited to the record. Nonetheless, this proposed reform
is indicative of the discontent with present administrative procedures.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In light of the conviction of academicians, polititians and the
general populace to revise the present regulatory system, administrative rulemaking procedures are likely to be changed in
this decade. 6 Proposals for altering administrative procedures
range from the complete overhauling of the APA to amendments
which would simply add some of the procedures utilized in formal rulemaking to informal rulemaking. ' This would create a
See

ROAD TO REFORM,

supra note 260, at 80.

24 Id at 81.
265I&
21
2"

See notes 239-59 supra and accompanying text.
See discussion in note 169 supra.
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more "unified" concept of administrative procedure rather than
the bi-polar structure presently in existence. Others prefer to
leave the APA intact, but insist that the agencies, through internal means, must provide for procedures not required by the
APA. The power of the agencies to "tack on" additional procedures is perceived to be one of the most efficient and flexible
ways to improve administrative procedures. 8 However, much
time probably will pass before the President and Congress reach
a consensus as to exactly what is necessary to improve the present regulatory system.
Turning to the narrower issue of the notice of proposed rulemaking, the courts and agencies will be faced with the question
of how much is enough. As emphasized in this paper, the EPA
and other agencies regularly allow for multiple rounds of notice
and comment when the subject matter of the rule is complex.
Courts too, have begun to emphasize the need for a more sufficient notice in order to insure more competent public participation in the rulemaking process. Courts are willing to remand a
rule for additional notice and comment when a more complete
record for review is necessary, but are reluctant to extend the
rulemaking process, given their perception that petitioners will
never be satisfied with any rule adopted, and that the agency's
position is unlikely to change.
The court's determination as to whether to prolong the
notice and comment period is also tempered by the need to
resolve matters of great importance expeditiously. At best, additional notice and comment results in more meaningful public
participation. At worst, it results in interminable delays in the
resolution of the issues. The problem of striking a balance between fairness and efficiency is exacerbated by a paradox which
surrounds the notice issue. Agencies are criticized for not adjusting the rule to reflect informed public comment, but are also
accused of being unfair when the change from the proposed to
the final rule is substantial. The court must apply the ubiquitous
balancing test to gauge the reasonableness of the agency's action in light of all the circumstances. Though this method of
after-the-fact review of complicated decisions made by both the

Verkuil, Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 258, 320, 327 (1978).
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agency and the petitioners throughout the rulemaking process is
imperfect, it must suffice until a more effective means of controlling agencies' decisions is devised.269
The agencies, however, are not limited to the use of hindsight when determining the fairness or the appropriateness of
their actions. They are involved in the decision-making process
from beginning to end. The means by which agencies reach decisions on issues of manifest importance should not be narrowly
circumscribed by any set of procedures. They should draw from
their accumulated experience and experiment with a broad
range of procedural innovations. Many of the reforms implemented by the Carter and Reagan administrations, and those
recommended by the Administrative Conference of the United
States"0 and the American Bar Asssociation"' should be adopted
by independent regulatory agencies to determine which ones
work best. Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, second
rounds of notice and comment, full and timely disclosure of the
data underpinning the agencies' contemplated decisions and
response to worthwhile criticisms of proposed rules may all be
used to better inform the public and to develop a record which
will withstand judicial review. Moreover, full adoption of these
mild procedural reforms might assuage the agencies' critics and
restore public confidence in the administrative system.
Charles R. Bailey

29 See notes 237-70, supra and accompanying text.
27

See Administrative Conference of-the United States, 1976 Report 43-47

(1976-77).
1' ROAD TO REFORM, supra note 260.
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